27% / 50%
Estimated rear-end crash reductions
IIHS’s 2017 study reported 27% for warning alone and 50% for warning plus AEB. Historical study vehicles, not a Tesla-specific result. [4]
Tesla · Active safety · About 8 min
Collision-assistance functions can warn or intervene in particular situations. Warning, emergency braking and engaging FSD are different behaviours; the name of one should not be used as evidence for another.
Go beyond the animation: distinguish the functions, work through the physics of delay and braking, and read independent crash research with its scope intact. A release-specific Collision Evasion claim still needs the exact release notes for the vehicle, hardware and region.
Driver assistance requires an attentive driver. Consult the instructions for your vehicle and region.
Explore the sequence
The overhead view shows a vehicle ahead in the path of travel. Positions are illustrative. No distance, speed or time-to-collision should be inferred from this drawing.
Cameras and environmental conditions affect what a system can detect. The shaded area is a visual aid, not a specification of sensor coverage or guaranteed detection.
Tesla describes Forward Collision Warning as a visual and audible alert. That warning is distinct from a braking command. The driver remains responsible for responding. [1]
Automatic Emergency Braking is a separate function that may reduce speed in certain collision situations. Its behaviour has conditions and limitations; the illustration does not show a guaranteed stop. [1]
Do not rely on an assistance system to detect every hazard or prevent a crash. Use the instructions and limitations in your vehicle’s manual, including the requirements for any supervised driving feature. [2]
27% / 50%
IIHS’s 2017 study reported 27% for warning alone and 50% for warning plus AEB. Historical study vehicles, not a Tesla-specific result. [4]
16.7 m
Unit conversion: 60 ÷ 3.6 × 1. This is distance before any change of speed, not a Tesla reaction-time claim.
≈5–200 km/h
The chapter lists this approximate operating range for FCW and AEB. Being within it does not guarantee detection or intervention. [1]
An emergency-braking feature is not proof that FSD will engage or re-engage. For a release carrying a Collision Evasion label, check its exact notes, supported hardware and region in the current software tracker.
A successful-looking animation cannot establish real-world avoidance performance. This sequence teaches the distinction between a hazard, a warning and a possible intervention. It is not an instruction to test the system.
Documented distinction
A warning informs the driver. Braking assistance changes vehicle speed. Steering assistance changes the path. NHTSA distinguishes these functions even when several appear in the same car. A dashboard message, a brake-pedal movement and a steering input are therefore different evidence. Recording which occurred is more useful than calling every response “self-driving”. [2]
Vehicle-specific fact
Tesla’s Collision Avoidance Assist chapter separately describes Forward Collision Warning, Automatic Emergency Braking and Obstacle-Aware Acceleration. The last can reduce acceleration near a detected obstacle; it is not interchangeable with emergency braking. The same chapter’s approximate 5–200 km/h FCW/AEB operating range belongs to the specified US Model Y manual. It is not a guarantee for every model, direction of travel, software release or road condition. [1]
| Function | Observable behaviour | What that alone does not establish |
|---|---|---|
| Collision warning | Visual or audible alert | That the brakes were applied |
| Automatic braking | System applies or supplements braking | That FSD became engaged |
| Obstacle-aware acceleration | Reduction in acceleration | A guaranteed stop |
| Supervised driving engagement | Driving mode indicates engagement | Universal availability of emergency re-engagement |
Worked example
Suppose two vehicles are travelling in the same direction. In a simplified constant-speed model, closing speed is the following vehicle’s speed minus the lead vehicle’s speed. If a follower is at 60 km/h and the vehicle ahead is at 40 km/h, the gap is shrinking at 20 km/h, or about 5.56 m/s. With a 20-metre gap, the constant-speed time to contact is about 3.6 seconds. These are hypothetical inputs, not a detection or activation threshold.
Explanation
Change the lead vehicle to a stationary object and the same follower closes at 16.67 m/s. At a 20-metre gap, the constant-speed time becomes about 1.2 seconds. Neither number predicts what a particular assistance system will do. Braking by either vehicle, a cut-in or a curved path changes the calculation. This is why a single speedometer reading cannot describe the complete collision problem.
Engineering model
Time to contact is a model, not a certainty. It depends on the assumption that relative motion continues as estimated. A real system must also decide whether an object is in the relevant path, whether its motion estimate is reliable and what intervention is appropriate. That conceptual chain explains why detecting something in an image and deciding to brake are separate tasks.
Physics context
Stopping distance includes travel before braking begins and travel while speed is being reduced. Rhode Island’s driver guidance separates perception, reaction and braking, and notes that traction changes braking distance. Assistance may change parts of the response, but it does not remove the physical distance required to slow the vehicle. [6]
Worked example
For an educational constant-deceleration model, distance = v × t + v²/(2a). Here v is initial speed in m/s, t an assumed delay in seconds and a a positive constant braking deceleration in m/s². The first term grows directly with speed; the second grows with its square. Doubling speed therefore doubles the delay distance and quadruples the braking distance when the assumptions stay the same.
Explanation
The chart assumes a one-second delay and 6 m/s² constant deceleration on a straight, level path. It omits tyre variation, grade, brake build-up, changing friction and a moving target. At 60 km/h, delay travel is 16.7 metres and modelled braking travel is 23.1 metres, totalling 39.8 metres. These are arithmetic results from chosen inputs, not measured Tesla stopping distances, safe following gaps or AEB performance specifications.
Primary research
Jessica Cicchino’s 2017 IIHS study compared police-reported crashes in 22 US states during 2010–2014. It estimated rear-end striking-crash reductions of 27% for forward collision warning alone, 43% for low-speed AEB and 50% for warning with AEB. The corresponding injury-crash reductions were 20%, 45% and 56%. These describe the studied systems and populations, not Tesla’s current FSD or a Collision Evasion release. [4]
Explanation
Those percentages are relative reductions in crash-involvement rates, not a guarantee that an individual intervention succeeds. The population, exposure measure, comparison group and crash definition matter. A result for rear-end crashes should not be relabelled as a result for all crashes, pedestrian incidents or autonomous driving.
Primary research
A 2019 IIHS study examined the rear-end crashes that remained. Turning, lane-changing lead vehicles, unusual vehicle types, snowy/icy roads and higher-speed roads were among the circumstances overrepresented in crashes involving AEB-equipped striking vehicles. The finding motivates broader testing. It does not imply AEB causes every crash in those circumstances or gives an individual Tesla a numerical failure probability. [5]
Engineering model
A system must act on incomplete observations while the scene changes. Triggering too readily can create unwanted interventions; triggering too late can leave less distance to respond. This is a general detection-and-control trade-off, not a claim about Tesla’s internal confidence thresholds. A chart of visible camera coverage would not solve it: seeing an object does not establish its future path or whether an intervention is appropriate.
Explanation
The Model Y camera chapter identifies obstructions and visibility conditions as performance concerns. Clean lenses and calibration address prerequisites, not every ambiguity. Separate sensing from stopping physics: better braking cannot compensate for every missed observation. [7]
Explanation
A useful incident record includes the vehicle, installed build, feature settings, conditions, displayed message and available unedited footage. Avoid guessing whether a visible slowing was a driver input or an automated action. Without the relevant evidence, an honest account can describe the observation while leaving the mechanism unresolved.
Explanation
The label Collision Evasion should be tied to the exact software release and its own description. It must not inherit every property of FCW, AEB or supervised driving merely because those functions share a vehicle. Likewise, the absence of that label in one public manual is not proof that no release contains additional behaviour. The correct question is which documented behaviour applies to which configuration.
Explanation
For an automatic-engagement claim, look for the release identifier, supported hardware, market, prerequisites, operating conditions and instructions for driver control. A social clip can be an observation; a complete primary release note is stronger evidence for the intended feature conditions. This review did not establish an accessible exact primary release note covering every re-engagement claim, so the guide does not turn secondary descriptions into operating instructions.
Explanation
Use the linked software tracker for current reports, then confirm the installed car’s own release notes and manual. A comprehensive explanation should make uncertainty specific: what is documented, what is calculated and what remains unverified. It should neither promise a rescue manoeuvre nor dismiss a reported feature simply because the name resembles an older safety function.
The next questions
No. It is a historical estimate for rear-end striking crashes among systems and vehicles in the 2017 study. It is not a Tesla-specific score or a current software evaluation.
No. A listed range is one operating condition. It does not guarantee detection, braking, avoidance or applicability to another model or market.
It isolates how delay and speed affect distance. Its assumptions are shown so readers can understand the arithmetic without mistaking the result for a vehicle test.
A clearer picture
Treat the alert and an automatic intervention as separate functions with their own conditions.
A clip from another car or market does not confirm a particular feature for your vehicle.
Plain English
Check the evidence
The references below support the stated mechanism and limits. The artwork is an original educational schematic. Version snapshots are separate from the reference-review date.
Definitions and limitations of warning and braking functions. Consult the manual for your own model and region.
Distinction between warnings, braking assistance and driver responsibility.
Check the exact release and its source notes for any release-specific Collision Evasion claim.
Primary research abstract: 22 US states, 2010–2014 police-reported crashes; system-specific estimated reductions, not a Tesla FSD evaluation.
Primary study identifying crash circumstances overrepresented among vehicles equipped with AEB.
Separates perception/reaction travel from braking distance and explains the role of road traction.
Visibility and calibration context for the configuration covered by this manual.
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